“If you don’t subscribe to any of them, one wonders in what sense you are a Calvinist or a member in goods standing with a given body.”

This is exactly my point. My self-identification with “Calvinism” doesn’t necessarily mean that I am a member in good standing with a confessional Reformed church. Most evangelicals today (at least if Biola is sufficiently representative) when they think “Calvinist” are likely to think of John Piper before anyone else, and he isn’t exactly the sort of Calvinist you’re thinking of (rejection of infant baptism being a big one). As it happens I am a member in good standing at a URC, but I’ve already expressed my current agnosticism towards ADS. I suppose, were I to reject ADS, I could no longer be considered “Reformed” in the confessional sense, but I would still consider myself a Calvinist. The label is simply evolving within evangelicalism today, that’s all I’m saying.

“I think you misunderstand concerning something being perspectival. If glory and justice were identical but different only in our minds, then the problem goes through since there is no distinction in what they are, only in how we think about them. ”

Right. But I think you’re misunderstanding my point. In order for there to be a perspectival difference, there must be some actual difference in the manner in which God manifests Himself. How would we perceive God’s manifestation of Himself as justice rather than glory? By the circumstances of the manifestation. So if God manifests Himself in the punishment of evil, we perceive it as justice. If He manifests Himself in any number of other ways, we might perceive it as glory. Thus it is perfectly reasonable to say that the manifestation of God’s justice requires evil without it following that the manifestation of His glory (though they are ontologically identical) likewise requires evil. The difference is located in our perspective. But I already said that even God’s justice does not require evil, so this point is moot.

“I am not sure why it is legitimate for the Calvinist to appeal to mystery here, at exactly the point where their system seems to face problems. When Calvinists argue against Arminians or more widely Libertarians, they chide them for appealing to mystery at exactly the point in which their systems seem to run into problem.”

I’m not sure I’m familiar with this. What problem does an Libertarian run into that leads them to appeal to mystery?

Where else would I appeal to mystery other than at that point where my finite understanding can take me no further, and where Scripture provides no further details? God has sovereignly ordained all things, but man is fully responsible for his own actions. This is what I believe Scripture teaches. I don’t think this is a contradiction, because (despite what some libertarians might think) I don’t think we fully understand just what it means for someone to be genuinely morally responsible, and we definitely don’t understand how exactly God’s sovereign ordaining works. Thus the mystery is located more in HOW these two are compatible, not simply in the fact that they are.

I’m not sure how this is different from, say, how we think about the Trinity. There is no contradiction in “one being in three persons.” But what exactly does it mean to be a distinct person and not a distinct being? Again, the mystery is in how this interaction is possible, not simply that it is (as if belief in the trinity were irrational). Or perhaps the incarnation is a better example. We tend to think we understand humans pretty well (the Fathers certainly had human nature, will, etc. all neatly categorized). So how do we get fully man AND fully God? With the incarnation, the mystery is located more in God’s action of incarnating Himself. He remains fully in His deity, and yet becomes completely human. How? I dunno. Every attempt to neatly categorize Jesus’ nature(s) in precise philosophical terms has usually ended in heresy. The appeal to mystery seems to be the only safeguard, and it seems perfectly legitimate to me.

Whenever the ineffable God is acting, in any way, I think it’s perfectly reasonable to expect mystery somewhere, especially when He doesn’t reveal everything to us.

“I wouldn’t say that a world in which every person damns themselves is “really great.” I would say it is better than a world by comparison that lacks all moral responsibility and is bereft of all moral value.”

Ok, but suppose, just hypothetically, that no matter how God creates the universe, it will turn out that every free agent in it will choose to damn themselves to Hell and not one soul will enter paradise. Should God create that universe?

“How is moral responsibility not the main thing if the entire goal of the Christian life is to become morally impeccable, to be conformed to the icon of Christ?”

Hmm…this sentence seems to illustrate my point. If the goal is to become morally impeccable, then isn’t the simple fact of being a morally responsible agent merely instrumental to that final end? This doesn’t mean that being morally responsible isn’t a good thing in and of itself. But even you seem to be admitted right here that it is not the “main thing.”

I think you misunderstand concerning something being perspectival. If glory and justice were identical but different only in our minds, then the problem goes through since there is no distinction in what they are, only in how we think about them. Epistemological distinctions don’t get you out of metaphysical problems. So moving from justice to glory only moves the problem. If God’s glory requires evil to be manifest, then the problem of dualism is the same. If divine glory doesn’t require evil, then why on a Calvinist gloss can’t God achieve this glory without all of the evil in the world? Why not predestine things another way?
Making room for “allowances” doesn’t imply that God doesn’t predestine an act. When you talk about Adam having free will, I don’t think you mean what I mean, because I am a libertarian and the latter and Calvinism are incompatible. On my view Adam could have done otherwise, but on the Calvinist gloss, I can’t see how that is possible and I don’t know any Reformed theologian that thinks that it is possible for Adam to do other than what God ordains. Synergism in sanctification doesn’t imply libertarian freedom either and is perfectly compatible with theological determinism. The number of wills working says nothing about whether those wills are determined or not.

I am not sure why it is legitimate for the Calvinist to appeal to mystery here, at exactly the point where their system seems to face problems. When Calvinists argue against Arminians or more widely Libertarians, they chide them for appealing to mystery at exactly the point in which their systems seem to run into problem. The appeal to mystery here seems ad hoc. A “comfortable tension” is not an explanation, but an admission that there isn’t one.
As for God working all things for Good, the context of the passage in Romans 8 is all of creation. (The same for the recapitulation of all creation and its uniting it to Christ in Eph 1:11) Is evil part of creation? There certainly seem to be evils that serve no purpose and that seems right to me. As for rocks, trees, beavers, etc. I think they all work for divine glory, but god has a plan, a logos for each of those things, but there is no logos for evil, which is why evil strikes us in such a way that we want it to be otherwise and yet can never seem to make it so. If evil is pointless, then it is pointless.

I suppose that “all things without distinction” could refer to God making use of every existing thing for some good, but not making use of every existing thing in the same way or at all times. I think that generally (though not always) the Reformed arguments from context against an unlimited interpretation of atonement texts show only that the Reformed reading is possible. To show that it is a necessary interpretation, one must invoke other biblical passages that supposedly show that God doesn’t will the salvation of all in Christ, or one must invoke theological principles that would entail this. I don’t see why the “Arminian” couldn’t do the same thing–use context to show that “all things” in Romans 8:28 for instance means all events that can help lead to resurrection, and that in Ephesians 1:11 “all things” refers to pretty much the same thing–all events that lead to our glorification and the union of the cosmos (and consequently the saved) with Christ.

Our views are not the same since on your view God’s allowance is deterministic and precludes libertarian freedom. Its one thing if we screw up on our own and if we screw up using our own powers because we were determined to do so, when God could have determined us not to.

God’s permission of evil on our view is because God can only preclude evil if he also precludes the possibility of moral values. From my perspective, the Reformed view that God ordains evil acts to serve his purposes to bring about some goods.

The relevance of saying that there are possible worlds with no evil acts is to show the conditions for such a world is incompatible with freedom and responsibility. Such worlds can be created by God, but of course none of the agents would be morally responsible. This is just to say that determinism and freedom are incompatible and that instant moral impeccability and freedom are incompatible. The irony here is that the Reformed actually agree with Rome on this point since they both agree that this is possible-the elect with the Reformed and the Immaculate Conception of Mary with Rome. They only fundamentally disagree over the scope of application but at bottom, they are the same here. We think they are both mistaken.

I wouldn’t say that a world in which every person damns themselves is “really great.” I would say it is better than a world by comparison that lacks all moral responsibility and is bereft of all moral value.

How is moral responsibility not the main thing if the entire goal of the Christian life is to become morally impeccable, to be conformed to the icon of Christ? Furthermore, the world in which everyone chooses to damn themselves seems to turn on the assumption that moral responsibility and freedom are only instrumentally good and not intrinsically good. Such a world may be far from ideal, but would God be innocent with respect to the damnation of those individuals? It certainly seems so. And it is hard to see on the Reformed deterministic model how God is good and innocent by determining anyone to go to hell. If you were correct it would imply that any world in which those goods could be had without freedom and the possibility of evil would be better. But isn’t that exactly the point, that those goods can’t be had without LFW and MR? If you say that they can and go the compatibilistic route, then you leave yourself open to the line that God could have created such a world without any evil and all the goods and this seems to directly impugn divine goodness. Also, I think you confuse a universe with a world. A possible world is a logical apparatus that enables us to think about ways things might have been. Some worlds are actual and they have to be possible to be actual, but the converse is not so. So to say that every possible world would turn out such that every person would damn themselves is to say that universal damnation is necessary for it occurs in every possible circumstance. But certainly given LFW, it isn’t necessary, for if it were, none of those worlds would include LFW. So your point here seems to turn on a straw man. Because I believe in LFW, I don’t believe we live in such a world and it is one reason for thinking that God is a good God, because he didn’t choose to create a world in which everyone damns themselves. By contrast, why think that the Reformed God is good if he could have chosen a world in which everyone is saved but chose this world in which the elect are saved and gobs of people go to hell?
Moreover, your example simply motivates the Reformed compatibilistic view, namely that it is the goal that things serve that has exculpatory value and not those things themselves. If every soul chose to go to hell, apart from the hidden determinism, this would seem to imply that freedom and moral responsibility lack exculpatory value for God so we need to look somewhere else, But as I pointed out above this makes assumptions that I think any good Libertarian should reject.

So, a universe in which every person damns themselves to Hell is really great because every person had the power to damn themselves to hell? I don’t think that’s what you’re saying, but it sure sounds like it.

Here’s the thing, I still think you’re skirting the issue. The possession of moral responsibility is a good thing, but not the main good that we’re talking about. Notice, you said that even if every single person in the universe damns themselves to hell, God isn’t responsible. But would you call that situation good? Not likely. And supposing that every possible universe would turn out exactly like that, with not a single soul choosing salvation, it might rightly be asked why God would create in the first place. If everyone goes to Hell, it’s really hard to see how God is a good God. So it seems to me that the free will defense, whether you cast it in terms of moral responsibility or not, is still ultimately about the good that is produced by free will. In other words, genuine moral responsibility may be what makes the free choice of salvation and subsequent righteous living so valuable and so good, but it is the good choice and good life that makes the universe worth the presence of evil.

“Why is this not relevant? And what do you mean by “can never be”? ”

I asked you HOW it was relevant.

By “can never be” I’m referring specifically to Plantinga’s version of the argument where he suggests that it isn’t possible for a world of free agents to always do what is right, presumably because there is no way for God to force them to do so. Also, would you say that this is the best of all possible worlds? If so, then I don’t see how there could even be a possible world where there is no evil.

You wrote:

“Isn’t that a good? I may have painted with too broad a stroke, but doesn’t this basically come down to the same thing? God allows for the possibility of evil because he can’t give us genuine moral responsibility without it, and our having this genuine moral responsibility is apparenlty a great good, or else it would not be worth the possible evils.”

I think that when we said “its not valuable because of the number of goods it causes” we meant something like this: regardless of the number of times free agents misuse their wills, the fact of their having moral responsibility is what makes free will good, and justifies God’s permission of evil. Even if we all misused our wills and damned ourselves, God would have done no wrong. It was our possession of moral responsibility that makes having the kind of freedom we do so great–not how many people in fact choose the good.

You wrote:

“Also, I’m not sure I see the relavence of positing a possible world where evil doesn’t exist if that world can never be actualized.”

Why is this not relevant? And what do you mean by “can never be”?

“The distinction Perry pointed out above is helpful. Free will isn’t valuable because of the number of goods it causes, but because it makes moral responsibility possible.”

Isn’t that a good? I may have painted with too broad a stroke, but doesn’t this basically come down to the same thing? God allows for the possibility of evil because he can’t give us genuine moral responsibility without it, and our having this genuine moral responsibility is apparenlty a great good, or else it would not be worth the possible evils.

Also, I’m not sure I see the relavence of positing a possible world where evil doesn’t exist if that world can never be actualized.

You wrote:

“You miss the point. The goods that result from free will are supposedly so great that God allows the evils that also result. The talk of the evils being merely collateral strikes me as a bit disingenuous, as if God’s granting the power of free will did not contain within it the equal potential of good and evil, in some sense making his allowing of evil simultaneous and indistinguishable from his granting of the power to do great good. If God did not allow any evil to occur, then He would, on this account, not be glorified and neither would there be the great goods that can only come from free will. Thus He must allow evil in order to achieve these outcomes. His disposition towards this allowance of evil is not in question, since the Reformed often distinguish between what God “wants” in terms of his disposition and what God actually ordains.”

The distinction Perry pointed out above is helpful. Free will isn’t valuable because of the number of goods it causes, but because it makes moral responsibility possible.

There is a huge difference between saying that evil *must* occur, and saying that evil *can* occur. On our view, there are possible worlds for which evil does not exist, (the possibility remains unactualized) and God accomplishes his purposes. So the accomplishing of good by God does not necessarily depend on evil. An implication of the possible worlds way of fleshing this out is that it is false that God *must* allow evil in order to achieve the desired outcome. Your talk of allowing evil being “simultaneous” with granting the power to do good is therefore inaccurate. Allowing evil is not simultaneous with granting the power to do good in the way you’re trying to get at, where permitting evil necessarily accompanies the power to do good. Also, because the acts are distinct and not necessarily connected, it is false that the “he who wills the end necessarily wills whatever means are necessary in the same way that he wills the end” principle that Kant (and perhaps people before him? I’m not sure) was privy to can apply here. Because evil is not a necessary means to the desired end, God doesn’t have to will it with the same necessity that he wills the end. And in fact God does not will it with necessity.

What seems disingenuous to me is the way some Reformed theologians talk about God’s relationship to evil. Because he who wills the end necessarily wills the necessary means in the same way, if a Reformed theologian thinks that God wills his glorification, and a necessary means is his “permitting” evil, then evil is indeed *necessary*, and God is equally responsible for both. “Permission” is a peculiar word here. Even if divine agency doesn’t interact with both the good end and the necessary evil events in the same way (ie. even if God only directly causes good stuff, and indirectly causes bad stuff) that doesn’t matter. Nor does it matter if God has a disposition of “not liking, disapproving of, hating, etc.” the necessary evils. God is still just as responsible for both, so using the terminology of “permission” is very misleading.

None of that is to say you actually believe the above, though.

You wrote:

“You assume a lot here. Where did I argue that evil is instrumental for God’s primary purpose for the world? I don’t think evil or suffering are instrumental nor necessary for accomplishing God’s purposes, not in the way you’ve described it. Notice that you said that evil is instrumental for God to display his justice, but that’s different from God displaying his glory, and I don’t think evil is necessary for God to display his glory. God displaying his justice in the punishment of evil is certainly one way for him to be glorified, but not the only way. In this sense, then, there’s nothing necessary about evil.”

What are these other means? Why did God not choose them?

If God did not choose them because they are not as good as doing it by punishing evil, then its not *really* true that there are other ways for God to do it. The only option that actually accomplishes his purposes is the one with evil.

But the only other way for you to flesh out the non-necessity seems to be that God did not choose the other worlds he could have created because they are equally good, but God just sovereignly decided to choose the equally good world that had evil in it. But that’s a hard line to tow–that there are worlds which God could have created that have no evil in them where God accomplishes all of his purposes, and that he chose *this one*, the one with evil. That seems counterintuitive.

You wrote:

“Again, this sort of talk seems incredibly disingenuous. How exactly is evil “unintended” when you willingly allow it to happen in order to achieve some great good?”

Hopefully the above explanation is helpful, and the invocation of the ends-means necessity principle helps to explain the difference.

You wrote:

“Like I said, I don’t think evil is absolutely necessary for God to display his glory. But I don’t think this particular line of reasoning is very helpful anyway. After all, if I did think that evil was necessary for the displaying of God’s glory, then your suggestion would merely sound to me like those people who say things like “a God who could make a contradiction true would be even more omnipotent and glorious than a God who can’t!” Maybe so, but no such God could exist, so who cares.”

If it is wrong to cause evil or to arrange for it to occur by necessity, and the only way for God to make the world and accomplish his purposes is by causing evil, then it seems to me like God should not create the world. That’s really the conclusion those Reformed folk should come to.

You wrote:

“As for your comments about the use of “all”, strictly speaking they don’t just say that “all” actually means “some.” They distinguish between “all without distinction” and “all without exception.” This makes sense when you’re talking about people groups, but I’m not sure what it means to say “all things” meaning “all without distinction.” God works every type of situation for good, but not actually every situation? That seems clumsy, not to mention lacking in any support. In any case, the arguments here are typically context-dependent, and none of this touches on the use of the word “world”, which I don’t think is ever used in a truly universal way.”

I suppose that “all things without distinction” could refer to God making use of every existing thing for some good, but not making use of every existing thing in the same way or at all times. I think that generally (though not always) the Reformed arguments from context against an unlimited interpretation of atonement texts show only that the Reformed reading is possible. To show that it is a necessary interpretation, one must invoke other biblical passages that supposedly show that God doesn’t will the salvation of all in Christ, or one must invoke theological principles that would entail this. I don’t see why the “Arminian” couldn’t do the same thing–use context to show that “all things” in Romans 8:28 for instance means all events that can help lead to resurrection, and that in Ephesians 1:11 “all things” refers to pretty much the same thing–all events that lead to our glorification and the union of the cosmos (and consequently the saved) with Christ.

God is just in and of Himself (it would have been correct to call God just prior to creation). He doesn’t need anything outside of Himself to be just. Is this what you were asking?

“I am not sure how as a Calvinist you can’t be committed to what your confessional standards explicitly and implicit teach.”

I’m curious, which confessional standards are you referring to? Even within the “Reformed” community, broadly construed, there are several, which don’t completely agree with one another. Perhaps I don’t ascribe to any of them. I don’t mean to sound evasive, but the label “Calvinist” can mean any number of things these days, especially with the recent resurgence of “Calvinism” within evangelicalism (which, 9 times out of 10, means little more than a surface-level acceptance of TULIP). I only point this out as a caution not to assume too much, especially since many of my own theological beliefs are still in formation. I don’t ascribe to the Westminster Confession, and I’m not familiar enough with the three forms of unity to be fully committed to them yet. In any case, I know what you meant, that ALL Reformed confessions and theologians tend to ascribe to divine simplicity. My comment was simply an admission that I haven’t thought deeply enough about this subject to commit to it.

“he problem is obvious, that if God is simple, justice and glory are the same thing, to manifest one is to manifest the other, making the distinction you attempt to draw vacuous.”

Not at all. MG seemed to be suggesting that God’s ultimate purpose from eternity past was to manifest His justice, requiring the existence of evil. I simply replied that God’s purpose was to manifest His glory. As you said, the difference would only be persepcival, but that’s all that’s necessary for my point. But perhaps even that was a poor choice of words. It might be better to say that His purpose is to glorify Himself. And as I said, this doesn’t require the presence of evil. MG seemed to be hinting that, for a Calvinist, God’s purpose is to show how just He is by squashing evil. I was simply rejecting that.

“Do you think God predestines all things whatsoever that come to pass or no?”

In one sense, yes. But would I allow room for saying that God “allows” certain things to happen as opposed to determining them? I think so. When I talk about Adam having free will, I think I mean just what you mean. Would I prefer to say that God “allowed” the Fall? Probably. But in another sense, He also ordained it. I don’t believe that anything whatsoever happens in a way that God doesn’t want it to (of course, this can mean a number of things). I also believe that post-regeneration a Christian cooperates synergistically with grace, so there can’t be strict determinism operating there either. Ultimately I think the precise interplay between God’s ordination of all events and the subset of those events which are also caused by human agency is a mystery, and I hold the two in a comfortable tension.

I am not sure how as a Calvinist you can’t be committed to what your confessional standards explicitly and implicit teach. The problem is obvious, that if God is simple, justice and glory are the same thing, to manifest one is to manifest the other, making the distinction you attempt to draw vacuous.

“If Calvinism doesn’t make the problem of evil worse, why on a Calvinist model didn’t God simply skip all of the evil and predestinate Adam to obey and everyone else to obey? If God can predestinate Christ in his humanity to always obey then why not everyone else?”

Calvinism is a species of theological determinism, logically antecedent states are sufficient to render inevitable one unique future. Saying Adam has free will doesn’t do much work unless I know what you mean by the term “free will.” Certainly you don’t think that Adam was free to do other than what God predestined him to do. If so, then Adam was “free” even though he was predestined by God to sin and could not have done otherwise. Could and would are not semantically equivalent. That is, if God had predestined Adam to sin but if Adam would have willed otherwise, then Adam could have willed otherwise, is a non-sequitur. Do you think God predestines all things whatsoever that come to pass or no?

“If you don’t think that God requires evil to manifest his justice, then why not skip the evil and manifest his justice without evil?”

I don’t think He is required to manifest His justice. Had there been no Fall, He would never have had to manifest it. Post-fall, however, His holiness requires that He does manifest His justice, as a response to sin.

“And if God is simple, isn’t it the case that his justice and his glory are the same thing, just perspectivally different?”

I’m not yet committed to the absolute simplicity of God, but if I were, I’m not sure I see the problem this poses.

“If Calvinism doesn’t make the problem of evil worse, why on a Calvinist model didn’t God simply skip all of the evil and predestinate Adam to obey and everyone else to obey? If God can predestinate Christ in his humanity to always obey then why not everyone else?”

As I’ve tried to argue before on this blog, I don’t see Calvinism as being equivalent to strict determinism. I believe that Adam had free will and could have chosen not to sin, but afterwards the whole human race was plunged into a state where they lacked the ability to choose not to sin. That doesn’t mean that every choice is precisely determined, fallen humans still have wills with the power to choose, even choose between many different options, just not the power to refrain from sin. I also wouldn’t say that every act of Jesus’ was predestined, again, if by predestined you mean determined in a sense that rules out any freedom on His part. Jesus certainly seems to have had free will. He was the new Adam after all.

“The argument you give about a God making a contradicton true would only be germane if the analogous situation were also a contradiction, namely that it is impossible for God to be glorified apart from evil, but I don’t see why those two things aren’t compossible. In any case, it would be admitting what you seem above to have denied, namely that evil is a necessary condition for accomplishing of some other goods, namely the glorification or manifestation of God’s justice.”

My point was that IF I believed that evil was necessary in order for God to display his justice, then such an argument would seem to me to be no different than the argument about God making a contradiction true. But since I do believe that evil is not necessary for God to display His justice, this argument still only works if I deny that Adam had free will and that God intentionally set up all this evil beforehand, which I’ve already denied.

I think that God can and intended to achieve virtue without the actualization of evil and that the intent of the powers of evil was to prevent God’s plan from reaching its fruition in the Incarnation, which is why the introduction of sin leads to death. If everyone dies, then obviously an incarnation is not possible.

If you don’t think that God requires evil to manifest his justice, then why not skip the evil and manifest his justice without evil? And if God is simple, isn’t it the case that his justice and his glory are the same thing, just perspectivally different?

Evil is unintended by God because he doesn’t willingly allow it to happen to achieve some great good. God permits the possibility of evil and could only therefore prevent its actualization by removing the possibility of any moral responsibility.

If Calvinism doesn’t make the problem of evil worse, why on a Calvinist model didn’t God simply skip all of the evil and predestinate Adam to obey and everyone else to obey? If God can predestinate Christ in his humanity to always obey then why not everyone else? Calivinism therefore does seem to make the problem of evil more intractable.

The argument you give about a God making a contradicton true would only be germane if the analogous situation were also a contradiction, namely that it is impossible for God to be glorified apart from evil, but I don’t see why those two things aren’t compossible. In any case, it would be admitting what you seem above to have denied, namely that evil is a necessary condition for accomplishing of some other goods, namely the glorification or manifestation of God’s justice.