I’m reading through J. P. Moreland’s Kingdom Triangle. In chapter four J. P. discusses, among other things, the transition in thought from a classic conception of tolerance to a modern conception of tolerance. He notes that tolerance is usually linked in some way with moral relativism, but then shows that idea to be self-refuting. Tolerance, by its very definition, depends upon moral objectivism. The following is a blog post I wrote almost two years ago on this very subject:
As it turns out, there is a crucial element to the idea of “Tolerance” that modern culture has failed to understand (or in some cases it has simply been ignored).
You see, there is a HUGE difference between being tolerant of a person and being tolerant of an idea. This means that I can disagree with your oppinion all I like, without disrespecting or degrading you as a person. Or look at it like this: If someone agrees with your stance on the war in Iraq, need you be tolerant of that person? Of course not. You don’t tolerate people who agree with you, you’re on the same side. So by its very definition you can only be tolerant of people who disagree with you. This idea seems to be missing in our modern understanding of tolerance. If I want to engage in civil discourse with someone who has an opposing view to my own (let’s say on abortion or Iraq) I can do so, all the while still being tolerant of the person himself.
The problem today is that as soon as I open my mouth and say something like, “I don’t believe abortion is morally right because…” I am immedately labeled as being intolerant. But just because I disagree with your opinion, that doesn’t mean I’m being intolerant of you as a person.
The sad truth is that this intolerance insult is really little more than a cover for moral cowerdice. People no longer wish to engage in any sort of conflict, even if it is the most civil of intelligent discourses, either because they are unable to defend their point of view or because they are simply unwilling. Thus we are left with a society where “progress” in the area of “tolerance” is ultimately inhibiting our progress everywhere else.
The bottom line is this: If we are to take the idea of “tolerance” to mean that we must be tolerant of all ideas, then no one is truly tolerant (especially the enlightened liberal, who hates everything that the Christian Right stands for, and is thus intolerant of their ideas) and the idea of tolerance becomes self-defeating. So the next time someone calls you intolerant, ask them to explain their definition of tolerance and then point out the self-defeating nature of their own definition.
(It’s also worth pointing out how often the moniker “intolerant” is linked with “bigot.” Without realizing it, many today are implicitly espousing the classical understanding of tolerance, that it is really only wrong to be intolerant of people themselves. Where they make a big mistake is in equating the intolerance of ideas with this intolerance of persons).
How does this presuppose moral objectivism?
In order to be able to tolerate someone else’s viewpoint it must be presupposed that your respective positions can be objectively evaluated. Or more simply, you can’t tolerate someone unless you disagree with them, and such disagreement would rely on an objectivism. In a relativist system, disagreement isn’t possible (not if one wants to be consistent), and so neither is tolerance.
Perhaps I should have just said that it presupposes objectivism, not specifically moral objectivism.
Does that make sense? Are you inclined to disagree with me here?
I’m not sure exactly what you mean by objectivism. Do you mean some sort of realism about physical objects and other minds? The correspondence theory of truth?
I don’t see why disagreement presupposes an objective standard. It could just presuppose a mutually-agreed standard that someone is not abiding by. Or it could just presuppose divergent interests and desires with no standard. Legitimate grounds for disagreement might be something different though; do you think there’s something there that can be fleshed-out?
Also, most relativists don’t care about consistency. They frequently live as though ethical realism is true.
I am inclined to disagree with you here, but that might be because I misunderstand what’s being said. Can you explain a bit more why presupposing a standard requires presuposing an objective standard?
Now, of course I think ethical relativism is clearly false and that belief in moral absolutism is part of what constitutes a flourishing, properly-functioning human life. But I’m not sure you’ve got an argument here against all forms of relativistic tolerance-promotion–at least not an argument that isn’t question-begging. Now, if the person you’re arguing with is willing to grant that tolerance is the absolute standard, you’ve got somethin. But most “toleranceists” don’t really hold to that.
Otherwise, thoguh, I agree with your person/idea distinction and think it is extremely important.
By moral objectivism all I meant was whatever is the opposite of moral relativism, and by moral relativism I mean a theory along the lines of “There is no TRUTH, just lots of truths that are all true.”
Now, what I meant by tolerance presupposing moral objectivism was simply this: If there is no TRUTH, and everyone’s truth is true, then there can be no real disagreement. My truth may not be your truth, but I still think that your truth is equally as true as my truth. Thus it can’t be said that I disagree with you in any real way, because for me to disagree is for me to judge your truth to actually be false.
To put it another way, I would have to AGREE that your truth is true, at least for you, even if it isn’t my truth. Does that makes sense?
If all that goes through, then there can’t be any meaningful sense of “tolerance” in a relativistic worldview, because tolerance requires that you disagree with someone in order for you to have to tolerate them.
Does that make more sense, or do you still think the argument doesn’t work the way I mean it to?
I think the confusion comes from the fact that standard usage considers *moral relativism* to be a thesis about the nature of *morality*, not the nature of reality as a whole. Moral truths and properties are dependent on human volition, emotion, and consent according to moral relativism, and there are no morel truths or properties that exist independent of human volition, emotion, or consent.
But if you were speaking of a broader sort of relativism that includes all propositions, then I see what it is you’re getting at. And its a good point. If a proposition is true simply because I will it or think it or feel it to be so, then tolerance seems impossible because it isn’t even true that we are having disagreement except according to a particular person’s perspective.
So yeah, that works.